Abstract
Share repurchases are increasingly becoming an important method for paying out cash to shareholders. In the US, for example, Jagannathan, Stephens and Weisbach (2000) report that, over the last two decades, the number and value of repurchase programme announcements grew at a compounded rate of 23% per year from 115 ($15.4 In Europe, on the other hand, share repurchases are not so common mainly because of institutional and cultural constraints. For example, in Austria, the legal system allows companies to repurchase their shares only to fulfill their obligations under the stock option plan for employees. In Sweden, companies have to go through a lengthy process to get a court approval. In the Netherlands companies have to pay 33¯% withholding tax on the difference between the repurchasing price and the average paid up capital ("gemiddeld gestort kapitaal") per share. In the UK, while they were made legal in 1981, share repurchases are only becoming popular in recent years because of the ambiguous tax treatment and fear of signalling a lack of profitable investment opportunities.
However, despite these constraints, a number of European companies have recently announced their intention to repurchase their shares. For example, in 1997 repurchases proposals announced by firms in Europe amounted to $47.2bn compared to $14.2bn in 1996. This increase is, however, driven mainly by 11 programmes made by such large firms as Diageo, BT, Reuters, ELF Aquitaine and TeleDenmark worth more than $1bn each (Financial Times 22 January 1998). In addition, British companies are by far the biggest buyers of their own shares with nearly 80% of the total repurchases.
A number of studies document the reasons for share repurchases. 3 The primarily US-based empirical studies show that signalling is the most prevalent explanation for open market repurchases (e.g., Comment and Jarrell, 1991; D'Mello and Shroff, 2000; Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen, 1995; Vermaelen, 1981) . These studies document that, on the announcement date of the intention to repurchase shares, share prices increase significantly and the pre-announcement cumulative abnormal returns are negative suggesting that the repurchasing companies are undervalued. This signalling hypothesis is based on the premise that managers are better informed and they launch a repurchasing programme to signal to the market that their shares are undervalued.
Survey studies also provide support for this hypothesis, as they show that managers repurchase their shares because they are 'undervalued' and represent a 'good investment' (Baker, Gallagher and Morgan, 1981; Wansley, Lane and Sarkar, 1989) .
This signalling hypothesis is, however, controversial because open market repurchases are not costly signals, as they do not commit the firm to actually buy back shares. 4 Moreover, there is a distinction between signalling management's expectations of future increases in the firm's cash flow and earnings, and signalling disagreement with the current market valuation of the firm's performance. Grullon and Ikenberry (2000) argue that while these two views are consistent with undervaluation, the former suggests that the firm is unable to communicate to the market its future prospects, while the later implies that market is inefficient because current prices do not reflect publicly available information. This later view is also supported by the findings that the markets under-react. For example, Ikenberry et al (1995) analyse a large sample of US open market repurchase programme announcements in the 1980s. They report significant positive abnormal returns of 12% in the four-year period following stock repurchases.
This suggests that the markets fail to impound information in stock prices quickly. This abnormal performance is most prevalent in firms where under-valuation is likely to be a more predominant factor, i.e., high book-to-market firms (value stocks) which generate 45%, compared to -4.31% for low book-to-market firms (glamour stocks). They suggest that the market is under-reacting because it treats repurchase announcements with skepticism leading prices to adjust slowly over time. Similar results are found in Canada where the three-year holding period cumulative abnormal returns amount to 21.4%, with value stocks generating 27% and growth stocks 13% (Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen, 2000) and for the case of tender offer repurchases over shorter event windows (e.g., Dann, 1981; Vermaelen, 1981) . 5 The purpose of this paper is to test the signalling hypothesis under different institutional settings and to highlight the extent to which institutional differences affect the short and the medium-term (up to six months) market reaction to share repurchases.
Using data from all European countries, the paper contrasts the market reaction to the announcement of share repurchases in UK and in other European countries (referred to thereafter as Europe), and documents the impact of institutional factors on the short-and medium-term stock price performance. The sample is, first, split into market-based and bank-based systems following La Porta et al. (1997 Porta et al. ( , 1998 classification. The UK is, like the US, a market-oriented country with common law that offers better protection to minority shareholders but characterized by liquid markets and unconcentrated company ownership, resulting in high information asymmetries. In contrast, other European countries are so-called bank-oriented and civil law countries where the pressure from shareholders to pay out cash is low as ownership is concentrated and markets are relatively illiquid, resulting in low information asymmetries. Therefore, if the market reaction to share repurchases is driven by signalling we would expect higher abnormal returns on the announcement date in the UK compared to other European countries. We also analyse the cross-section market reaction of firms within UK and other European countries. We expect firms with high information asymmetries to generate high abnormal returns on the announcement dates.
Further research in this area is warranted for a number of reasons. First, the evidence from this analysis will highlight the extent to which European markets are homogeneous in their behaviour to facilitate the potential integration of European markets. Second, as Fama and French (1998) argue, it is useful to investigate whether patterns in security returns documented in the United States hold in other countries to ensure that such patterns are not the outcome of data mining. Finally, the cross-country analysis will shed some light on the extent to which the behaviour of share prices when firms announce their intention to repurchase shares are affected by institutional factors.
The analysis of the 642 announcements of share repurchases reported in Reuters Business Briefings and Extel Financial over the 1985-1998 period reveals that the vast majority of these announcements (465 representing 72% of the total) are made in the UK. In addition, about 59% of such announcements occurred in 1997 and 1998. In the pre-1996 period, very few share-repurchasing programmes are announced outside the UK. The results also show that on the announcement date, share prices increase by 1.64% in UK and 1.06% in Europe. This abnormal performance is statistically significant but lower than the 3% documented in the US (e.g., Stephens and Weisbach, 1998) . In the UK, this abnormal performance extends 151 days after the announcement.
For example, over the period +21 to +151 days after the announcement date, a buyand-hold strategy will result in an abnormal performance of 4.15% (t=3.98), equivalent to 8.12% per year. This abnormal performance is higher than the 2.9% annual return in the US (Ikenberry et al 1995) and 7.08% in Canada (Ikenberry et al 2000) . In contrast, in other European countries, the event date abnormal returns are not strong and the post-announcement period abnormal performance is negative. Over the [+21 to +151] period, share prices decrease by 5.29% (t = -1.66).
The analysis of individual European country reveals that in France and Italy, where share repurchases announcements are relatively more common, the announcement-period abnormal returns are not statistically significant. Over the postevent period [+21 to +151] share prices decrease by 12.94% in France, though not significant, and by 6.15% in Italy (t = -1.80) In other European countries, share prices decrease by 1.01% (t = -0.87). The same results are obtained when the announcements are split into common and civil law countries and into countries with high and low investor protection. In particular, in countries with high investor protection share prices increase by 3.80% in the post-announcement period while in countries with low investor protection share prices decrease by 6.10% (t-statistic of difference of 3.54 is significant at 0.01 level). The regression results indicate that this abnormal performance is also a function of the repurchasing method, a dummy for confounding announcements, the legal system of the country in which the announcing firm is operating and the forecast error which proxy for information asymmetry.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I presents the data and the methodology. Section II discusses the results. Section III presents the conclusions.
I. Data and Methodology
The sample is constructed by identifying all announcements of intention to repurchase ordinary shares reported in the Reuters Business Briefings (RBB) from [Insert Table I here]
To assess the market reaction to the announcement of intention to repurchase shares, I compute the abnormal returns using the market model. The estimation period spans from day -290 to day -41 relative to the announcement date. The coefficients of the market model are computed by running a regression of the each firm's raw returns against each firm's country main market index. The results are replicated using the market-adjusted returns, where a is set equal to zero and ß to one, Dimson (1979) and Scholes and Williams (1977) The second relates to the assumption that the returns are normal. Brown and Warner (1985) show that the degree of non-normality in daily NYSE/ASE abnormal returns poses no serious problems for correct test statistic specification in such samples.
However, Campbell and Wasley (1993) document a substantial non-normality in the daily returns of NASDAQ securities. I report also the sign test and the median, which are free of specific assumptions concerning the distribution of abnormal returns.
The third potential problem relates to inferences with clustering. The standard event study methodology assumes that the abnormal returns on individual securities are uncorrelated in the cross-section. This is a reasonable assumption if the event windows of the included securities are not overlapping in calendar time. In this case we can calculate the variance of the aggregated sample CARs without concern about covariances between individual sample CARs, since they are zero. 8 However, given that, as reported in Table I , more than 59% of the events occur in 1997 and 1998, the clustering bias is likely to affect the results. To overcome this problem the t-statistics are computed as the sum of the standardized prediction errors divided by the square root of the number of sample firms, as suggested by Brown and Warner (1985) .
The abnormal returns are computed over the -20 to +151 days relative to the announcement date. Data limitation constrained the post-announcement period and the use of unbiased methodologies such as these suggested by Barber and Lyon (1997) . Kothari and Warner (1997) show that the misspecification bias induced by the use of the market model in testing long-term returns is less pronounced when the cumulation period is less than 12 months. Nevertheless, the simulated results using the returns of size and book-to-market matched control firms as a benchmark are also reported. (1995) findings in the US where the abnormal returns over the [-20 to -3] period amount to -3.07% (t = -9.91), suggesting that companies time their announcements to repurchase shares. Over the 5 day-period (-2 to +2), the cumulative abnormal returns amount to 1.48% for the whole sample, 1.64% in the UK and 1.06% for the rest of Europe. These abnormal returns are statistically significant but they are lower than the 3.5% found in the US market (e.g., Ikenberry et al, 1995, Stephens and Weisbach, 1998 The p-value of the Mann-Whitney statistics indicates also that the differences in medians between the two samples are significant. Consistent with the US evidence, these results suggest that, in the UK, the market is under-reacting to the announcement of share repurchases. Figure 1 charts the cumulative abnormal returns in UK and other European countries over the [-40 to +151] period.
II. Empirical Results

A. Announcement period abnormal returns
[Insert Figure 1 here] European countries generate abnormal returns of 1.51% (t = 2.29).
In the post event period share prices in France continue to decline steadily. Over the [+21 to +151] post-event period share prices decrease by 12.94% (t = -1.17). In
Italy, share prices decrease by 6.15 (t = -1.80) despite the increase in the shares prices [Insert Table II here]
B. Impact of changes in institutional settings
Over the sample period, two countries, namely France and UK, have undertaken a set of institutional changes on how companies should repurchase shares and how selling shareholders should be taxed. In France, the Law of 2 July 1998 gave greater freedom to companies to repurchase their shares. In the UK, the tax and regulatory environment relating to the treatment of the advanced corporation tax when firms repurchase their shares changed drastically. These two countries are analyzed to assess the extent to which institutional settings affect share-repurchasing activity.
[Insert Table III here]
B.1. The introduction of the simplified buyback procedure in France in July 1998
In France, traditionally share repurchases were prohibited on the grounds that they entail an undesirable confusion between the roles of debtors and creditors. Thus companies can buyback their shares only in the framework of a reduction of capital not motivated by losses and the shares acquired have to be cancelled.
12
Over the years, however, various measures were taken which alternated between relaxation of the rules and their further strengthening. For example, the set of measures introduced to implement the Second EC Directive in 1981 extended the prohibition to acquisition by subscriptions, acquisitions through third parties, and the acceptance of a firm's own shares as a guarantee or as a guarantee for the third party to acquire the firm's shares.
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The law has, however, introduced more generous measures such as buying back the shares to distribute to employees in the framework of employee participation schemes or to temporarily support the share price quotation.
The Law of 2 July 1998 amended these possibilities and gave greater degrees of freedom. First, the law repealed the possibility of buying back shares to support the stock market quotation but introduced the simplified buyback procedure where a company is allowed to buyback and hold up to 10% of its shares without any specific purpose. Second, the law extended the possibility of buying back shares in the framework of reduction of capital not motivated by losses by revoking the prohibition for a company to proceed with buybacks if it had earlier issued exchangeable or convertible bonds or warrants. This law is expected to result in an increase in the number of firms repurchasing their shares but to a reduction in the event date abnormal returns as firms are allowed to buyback their shares for other reasons than signalling. year. In the 6 months after the law of July 1998 share repurchases reached 22. Thus, as expected, the Law of July 1998 has lead more French companies to announce their intention to repurchase their shares. However, the t-statistics of the differences in means abnormal returns in the pre-and post July 1998 are not significant suggesting that the law has not resulted in a change in the market perception of this activity. In the pre-1998 period the abnormal returns over the cumulating periods are not significant at any confidence level. In the post-July 1998 period, the abnormal returns over [-2 to +2] days of 0.26%, although positive, are not significant (t = 0.34). However, in the preevent period [-20 to -3] , the cumulative abnormal returns of -3.16 are significant (t = -2.22), suggesting that companies time the announcement of their intention to repurchase their shares. In contrast, in the post-event period +3 to +20, the abnormal returns decrease by 2.36% ( t = -1.66), suggesting that the market is mean reverting. This negative abnormal performance extends to the 151 days after the announcement date with share prices decreasing by 17.21% (t = -7.89). These results suggest that, although the July 1998 law increased the number of share repurchase announcements, the market does not appear to value this strategy favorably.
B.2. The UK tax and institutional changes
The market perception of share repurchases depends on their tax treatment, i.e., on whether they are treated as dividends or capital gains. This, in turn, is a function of the repurchasing method adopted and on whether the Inland Revenue, the UK tax authority, allows companies to treat share repurchases as dividends. In general, onmarket repurchases are treated as capital gains and off-market repurchases where shareholders sell directly to the company through tender offers and private transactions, or through a broker who is acting as an agent for the company, are treated as dividends.
In this case the firm is committed to repurchase the shares, shareholders know that they are selling to the company and the Inland Revenue allows them to claim the tax credit.
In the UK this split between on-and off-market is not a clear cut. Before September 1994, companies had to repurchase their shares in the open market. These repurchases are considered as on-market. However, exceptionally, companies get a permission from the Inland Revenue to treat part of the share repurchases as dividends.
In this case, they pay the tax credit in the form of Advanced Corporation Tax (ACT) 14 In July 1997, the UK government announced changes in the taxation of dividends distributed to pension funds. As from 3 July 1997, pension funds are not allowed to claim the tax credit on dividends they receive, making these investors indifferent between dividends and share repurchases. were only a total of 81 announcements, an average of 9 per year. Over this period the announcements were highly scattered. In the 3 months just before the 21 September 1994, when BZW invented the 'agency buybacks' method, there was no single announcement. In the following 2 years to 7 October 1996, a total of 122 announcements were made, an average of 61 announcement per year.
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In the following period which spans from 8 October 96 to 2 July 98, the number of announcements decreased to 44. However, taking account of the time period, the average number of announcements is 60.
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In between 3 July 1997 and 31 December 1998, the number of announcements increased to 219, mainly because of the abolition of the advanced corporation tax which removed the penal tax charges on buybacks. This trend in share repurchases is consistent with Rau and Vermaelen (2001) findings.
In the first case, i.e., in the pre-September 1994 period the abnormal returns of 1.18 over the event period -2 to +2 are not statistically significant (t = 0.36). Similarly, in the 41 days before and 20 days after the announcement date, the abnormal returns are not significant. However, over the [+21 to +151] days, share prices increase significantly by 6.62%. In the second case when companies used agency buybacks, i.e., from September 1994 to 7 October 1996, share prices increase by 1.42% on the announcement period -2 to +2 and carried on increasing up to day 20 by 4.37%. Thus over the period -2 to +20, the cumulative abnormal performance amounts to 5.79%.
Thereafter, the abnormal performance of -0.46% is not significant at any confidence level. In both these cases the pre-announcement abnormal returns are not significant, suggesting that companies are not timing their repurchases announcements. In the third case when the tax authorities abolished the loophole (from 8 October 1996 to 2 July 1997), the abnormal returns over the event period -2 to +2 of -0.13% are not significant. However, in the pre-announcement period [-20 to -3] Thus, a buy-and-hold strategy from day -2 to day +151 will result in a cumulative abnormal performance of 12.23%. In the pre-event period the abnormal performance is not statistically significant. has lead the market to value more share repurchases as companies do not incur the potential advanced corporation tax costs and they do not repurchase their shares for the sole purpose of offering tax credits to tax-exempt institutions. In the post-event period
[+21 to +151] the cumulative abnormal returns in the post-July 1997 period are different from the second and third cases. This suggests that the market is under-reacting more to the announcement of repurchases after the abolition of the tax credit.
C. Impact of Legal Settings
Under the agency setting share repurchases may be used to transfer wealth from existing atomistic shareholders to large shareholders. In particular, companies in countries whether the investor protection is low can use more often privately negotiated buybacks whereby firms repurchase shares from a large shareholder at a negotiated price. This method can be used to consolidate control and to eliminate a troublesome shareholder. In order to shed more light on these issues, I split the sample of announcements into their respective level of investor protection. La Porta et al (1998) show that among the countries in the world that offer strong protection for their minority shareholders are UK, Ireland and Spain. Other European countries are considered to offer low protection for small investors. Table IV reports the cross-legal system differences in returns. Panel A shows that in the pre-event period [-40 to -3] the difference in cumulative abnormal returns across the two legal systems is not statistically significant. On the event date 0, the abnormal returns of 0.45% in low protection countries are statistically lower than the 0.95% in high protection countries (t = 1.67).
Over the [+21 to +151] period, share prices in low protection countries decrease by 6.10% while those in high protection countries increase by 3.80%. The difference in means between the two systems is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. suggesting that in high protection countries, financial companies are more likely to repurchase shares. As shown in the industrial classification of the sample firms in Table   I , in high protection countries (mainly UK) there are more investment trusts buying back their shares to reduce their discount, thus to signal their under-valuation. Table IV , Panel B. also shows that in the high protection countries the proportion of shares companies intend to repurchase of 11.6% is significantly higher than the 9.41% sought by companies in low protection countries.
In the next three rows of Table IV [Insert Table IV here] Table V reports the results of the regressions where the impact of these factors on the announcement date and post-event abnormal returns are taken simultaneously into account. The results show that low protection dummy, negotiated dummy, other announcements dummy and size have negative impact on day 0 abnormal returns. In contrast, the analysts' forecast errors and the analysts' accuracy are positively related to the announcement date abnormal returns. However, the book-to-market does not appear to affect the announcement date abnormal returns. These results suggest that smaller companies that are subject to high information asymmetries, that operate in high investor protection countries, that do not announce other news with share repurchases and do not use negotiated method to repurchase shares generate significantly higher abnormal returns on the announcement of share repurchases.
The low protection dummy, the legal system in which the firm is operating, and the degree of information asymmetry, as shown in Equations (6) to (8), affects the postevent cumulative abnormal returns. The results indicate that companies that operate in common-law countries and/or in high investor protection and those that are subject to high information asymmetries generate significantly higher post-event abnormal returns.
This suggests that for these companies, the markets under-react to the news conveyed by the announcement of the intention to repurchase shares.
[Insert Table V here]
Conclusions
The purpose of the paper is to document the market reaction to share repurchases in UK and continental Europe. The analysis of the institutional framework shows that UK companies are likely to be different from their European counterpart because of a number of reasons. First, unlike other European countries, UK is a marketbased system where agency costs and information asymmetry problems are higher. UK is also governed by common law, which offers better protection to small shareholders.
Finally, in the UK share repurchases are cancelled while in Europe, companies can choose between canceling the shares they repurchased or keeping them as treasury stock. These institutional differences are expected to affect the market reaction to the announcement of share repurchases. In particular, it is hypothesized that in the UK the market will react more favorably to the announcement of the intention to repurchase the shares than in Europe. In addition, the under-reaction hypothesis documented in the US is also expected to be supported in the UK because of the similarities between the structures of the US and UK market systems.
Using a comprehensive sample of 643 announcements, the paper shows that the vast majority of these announcements are made in the UK. This is consistent with the proposition that share repurchases are not in the culture of continental European companies and that the restrictive legislation and heavy tax burden prevents these companies from returning their excess cash to their shareholders through buybacks.
The results also show that there are stringent differences between the market reaction to share repurchases in UK and continental Europe. On the announcement day the increase of share prices increase significantly more in the UK and in continental Europe the announcement date abnormal returns are barely significant. This increase in UK by 1.64% is however substantially lower than the 3.5% documented in the US.
Over the post-event period, +21 to +151 days relative to the announcement date, share prices in the UK continue to increase to reach 4.15%, suggesting that, like in the US, the UK market is under-reacting to the announcement of the intention to repurchase shares. In contrast in Europe, share prices decrease by 5.29%.
The paper also documents the impact of the legal system, repurchasing method, levels of information asymmetry, growth, and size on the abnormal performance. The results indicate that the market reaction is negatively related to negotiated method, size, and other confounding announcements but positively related to information asymmetry variables. In addition, in common law countries and in countries where the rights of minority shareholders are protected the market reacts positively to the announcement of the intention to repurchase the shares. In the post-event period, share prices increase by an annual compounded rate of about 8%, compared to a decrease by 6.10% in low investor protection countries. These results suggest that institutional settings as well as firm specific factors explain the market valuation of share repurchases in Europe.
The analysis is concentrated mainly on the announcement of the intention to repurchase shares. It did not consider whether companies have actually bought back their shares and whether this has resulted in the positive post-announcement abnormal returns in the UK and the negative performance in the other countries in Europe. The analysis has also not considered the long-term performance of repurchasing companies.
In addition the study has not considered alternative measures of information asymmetry such as volatility in stock returns, standard deviation of forecasts, and number of analysts following companies. The extent to which these factors will provide support or alter the conclusions is the subject of further research.
Fama, E. F., and K. R. French, 1998, Value versus growth: The international evidence. The FTSE Industrial Classification is used. Consumer goods include breweries, spirits, food manufacturers, household goods, health care, pharmaceuticals and tobacco. Financial includes banks, insurance, life insurance, merchant banks, other financial, property and investment trusts. General manufacturing includes building construction and material, chemicals, diversified, electrical and electronics, engineering, printing paper and packaging, textile and apparel. Mining Extraction (14) and Ireland (5), a total of 484 observations. Low Protection (Low) are all the remaining 158 announcements in other European countries. The abnormal returns are based on the market model with coefficients computed over the -290 to -41 days before the announcement date. Analysts' bias is the ratio of analysts' forecast error over absolute value of actual earnings. Analysts' accuracy is the absolute value of the ratio of analysts' forecast error over actual earnings. B/M is the ratio of book value of equity over market value of equity at balance sheet date. T is the t-statistic of the difference in means. 
Table V. Regression Results
The table reports the regression results using day 0 (Equations 1 to 5) and CAR +21 to +151 (Equations 6 to 8) as the dependent variable. The abnormal returns are based on the market model with coefficients computed over the -290 to -41 days before the announcement date. Dlegal is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the legal system of the country of quotation of the company making the announcement is based on common law, 0 if it is based on civil law. Common law countries are UK and Ireland. DlowP is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the country of quotation of the company making the announcement does not protect minority shareholders, 0 otherwise. This dummy is equal to zero for UK (465 observations), Spain (14) and Ireland (5), a total of 484. Dfinance is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the company making the announcement is from the finance sector. Negociate is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the company is buying the shares from major shareholder. Tender is dummy variable equal to 1 is the company is using tender method to repurchase the shares. Other ann. Is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the announcement to repurchase shares is made at the same time as another announcement, such as earnings. Analysts' bias is the ratio of analysts' forecast error over absolute value of actual earnings. Analysts' accuracy is the absolute value of the ratio of analysts' forecast error over actual earnings. t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significant at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level, respectively.
Variables
AR 0 CAR +21 to +151
(1) (2) (3) (5) (6) 
UK
Continental
Continental Europe
Institutional Framework
Share repurchases are subject to a large number of institutional differences across the European countries. First, they are banned in Austria but have been permitted for some time in countries such as the UK, Switzerland, Spain, the Netherlands, France, Italy, Denmark, Sweden and, recently, Germany. Second, in some of the countries where they are allowed, it is still difficult to repurchase shares as they are restricted to certain companies (e.g., France), require a lengthy process court approval (Sweden), or are subject to punitive tax (Switzerland and the Netherlands). This appendix provides a brief overview of the similarities and differences across the European countries. Table A provides a summary of theses findings.
A. Legal differences
Share repurchases in the European member states are regulated by the Second
Company Law Directive 77-91/EEC (12/76), modified by directive 92-101 (11/92).
This legislation aims at maintaining capital integrity and shareholders' rights as equal.
The directive allows companies to repurchase only their fully paid up shares out of distributable reserves. Companies can either repurchase their shares to keep them as treasury stocks or to reduce the company's share capital. In any case shareholders have to approve the repurchasing programme which stipulates the number of shares and the repurchasing period which is usually 18 months. When a company buys back shares to keep as treasury stock the maximum is limited to 10% of the capital subscribed, and the net assets should not be lower than the capital subscribed including non-distributable reserves. The shares repurchased are shown on the asset side of the balance sheet and a reserve of the same amount, unavailable for distribution should be included in the liabilities. These shares are not entitled to dividends and votes. If the shares are repurchased for the purpose of reducing the company's share capital, the firm should make an offer to all shareholders, and creditors have the right to obtain a security for credit not implicitly covered.
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The European Directives did not, however, specify how share repurchases should be taxed. As a result, the European countries are not homogeneous in their intensity and treatment of share repurchases. In Belgium share repurchases should be tendered to all shareholders on the same terms by prospectus under the supervision of the Belgian Banking and Finance Commission.
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In Denmark companies can only use capital that may be distributed as dividends to repurchase shares and shareholders' authorization must specify the maximum number of shares to be repurchased and the minimum and maximum price the company may pay for the share.
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In Finland companies were allowed to repurchase their shares only after 1 September 1997 to comply with the EC directives. 
B Tax treatment differences
The basic commonality across all European countries is that the purchase price and the costs associated with share purchases are not deducted from taxable income.
However, despite this similarity, the taxation treatment of share repurchases differs significantly across the European countries. The following section presents a summary of the main personal and corporate tax characteristics underlying share repurchases.
B.1. Personal income taxes
The tax treatment of share repurchases depends on the status of the shareholder and the tax system of the country in which the firm is undertaking share repurchases.
Shareholders can be corporate or individual, minority or large, domestic or foreign, and taxed or tax-exempt. In addition, whether an imputation system applies and, if so, to which kind of shareholder, may have a significant impact on the decision by companies to repurchase their shares. In general there are three basic methods for taxing shareholders who sell shares to their own company: taxation as dividend distribution or liquidation proceeds, as a capital gains, or as both a dividend and a capital gains.
Share repurchases can be taxed as dividends or liquidation proceeds, in particular when shares repurchased are cancelled and when the off-market repurchasing method is used. This is the case of Belgium, Denmark, France and Switzerland. Finally, share repurchases can be treated under both the dividend and the capital gains regime. For example, in the UK the difference between the purchase price and share capital is first considered to be a dividend, and subsequently the difference between the share capital and the tax base (e.g., the acquisition price) is treated as a capital gain. As a result, in normal circumstances where shares are bought above the nominal value, the selling shareholder is deemed for income tax purposes to have received a dividend in combination with a capital loss. This capital loss can be set off against capital gains but not against dividend income.
Over the sample period share repurchases in the UK were subject to a number of different tax treatments driven mainly by the presence of the imputation system which discriminates between dividends and capital gains. Lasfer (1996) shows that, for exempt institutions, the after-tax return on dividends is higher than that on capital gains. As a results these institutions, such as pension funds, the largest shareholders in the UK, prefer share repurchases to be treated as dividends rather than as capital gains. Before 
B.2. Corporate taxes
In addition to the personal tax treatment, share repurchases may also be taxed at individual company level. For example, in the Netherlands, companies have to pay 33 1/3% in tax on the difference between the buyback price and the average paid-up capital per share for any shares bought back. This tax treatment makes repurchases not attractive to tax paying shareholders and to the company. In addition, for companies with dual listing, dividend equalization agreements prevent such companies from doing a buy back in just one centre. Thus such companies are placed at a disadvantage relative to their peers because they have to use equity to finance an excess cash balance, so driving up the cost of capital. In Belgium, if the proceeds necessary for the purchase of the shares is taken from "taxed reserves", there is no additional tax liability at the level of the company. If, on the other hand, "untaxed reserves" are used, these untaxed reserves are subject to corporate income tax at the level of the company. In the UK, a company that repurchases its shares is subject to the payment of the Advanced Corporation Tax, until April 1999. Other studies also document the fact that the use of share repurchases to pay out cash to shareholders was becoming in the US equivalent to the traditional cash dividend payments. Bagwell and Shoven (1989) report that share repurchases represent 31% of cash dividends. Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1995) show that the value of share repurchase from 1985 to 1995 was $334 billion, nearly half the amount paid in cash dividends. In 1998, US companies distributed more cash to investors through share repurchases than through cash dividends. See Grullon and Michaely (2000) for a review of dividends compared to share repurchases.
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See Dittmar (2000) , and Grullon and Ikenberry (2000) for a review. In particular, repurchases allow companies to distribute free cash flow, to adjust their capital structure, to use in the conversion of convertible loans and warrants, as a measure to counter hostile takeovers, and in the course of corporate reorganizations. Fenn and Liang (2001) show that share repurchases are driven by the growth in managerial stock options. Bagwell and Shoven (1989) argue that the increase in share repurchases in the mid1980s indicates that companies were substituting repurchases for cash dividends to generate lower-taxed capital gains to their shareholders. However, this hypothesis is not strongly supported by subsequent tests (e.g., Jagannathan, Stephens and Weisbach, 2000; Grullon and Michaely, 2000) . 4 In practice most of the open market announcements are later executed. Stephens and Weisbach (1998) study a sample of 450 open market repurchases programmes announcements in the US over the period [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] . They find that between 74 and 82% of the shares are later repurchased. This method provides firms with higher flexibility as they offer more freedom in deciding when to buy and how many shares to buy. Stephens and Weisbach (1998) show that the popularity of open market repurchases is less likely to be due to managers' attempt to manipulate their firm's share prices than to inherent flexibility of these programmes with respects to the timing and quantity to repurchase. In particular, they find that firms adjust their buyback behaviour to their cash position. Ikenberry and Vermaelen (1996) argue that open market purchases can be interpreted as "exchange options" that give the firm the ability to exchange the market value of the firm for its 'true' value at management's discretion. Comment and Jarrell (1991) show that open market repurchases outnumber self-tenders by ten to one. Similarly, Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1995) and Stephens and Weisbach (1998) In a tender offer the firms invite their shareholders to sell specific number of shares at specified price and over a given time period (three weeks to one month). The firm retains the option to withdraw the offer if fewer shares are tendered or to extend the offer beyond the originally specified period. Tender offers can be Dutch auction where a range of prices at which holders can tender are specified, or fixed price where the firm specifies a single maximum purchase price (Vermaelen 1981) . The fixed tender offer is traditional and more common. Comment and Jarrell (1991) find that tender offers tend to be adopted more by companies that repurchase large number of shares.
The announcement date share price reaction to tender offers is high and the fixed-price tender offers generally signal the most information to investors. The data on the split of tender offers is not available for the sample.
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These formalities do not apply if the company is exposed to severe or imminent risk, when shares are repurchased to cover employee share option schemes or where the state legislation already authorizes share repurchases. The proposal is based on the premise that if firms are able to keep shares repurchased as treasury stock; they will resale them when appropriate, resulting in greater flexibility in adjusting share capital, decreasing the cost of capital, increasing investment, and adjusting the debt-equity ratio. The document provides also a streamlining of procedures in case of management of employee share schemes. The proposal is, however, still at a consultative stage.
